OXFORD STUDIES IN METAPHYSICS Volume 3
- Dean W. Zimmerman
- Penerbit : Oxford University Press
- Tahun : 2007
- ISBN : 978–0–19–921839–4
The debate over personal identity is a complex one, involving many contrasting views, and ingenious and controversial arguments. But standing back from the complexity, we can see a couple of major and strongly contrasting groupings into which many recently defended views may be seen as falling. At one extreme, we find diverse forms of Psychological Reductionism, and at the other, views we may group under the label ‘‘Animalism’’. Though Psychological Reductionism is (deservedly, I think) more popular, Animalism also has its following, and has fairly recently been given an unusually blunt, succinct, and passionate defense by Eric Olson in Olson (1997).
The doctrinal opposition between these main groupings tends to line up rather neatly with a general methodological opposition which has ramifications in metaphysics generally: one where the key issue is, roughly, the relative priority in metaphysics of folk intuitions and a priori judgments, as against the findings of natural sciences.